Iraq: Plan B

My friend and fellow blogger Jeff Jarvis asks “so how would you solve Iraq?”  He identifies himself as a liberal hawk and a “warblogger” because he supported going into Iraq in the first place as did I.  Nor am I as sure as almost everybody seems to be now that that was a mistake; I’m not claiming to have been misled on WMD or terror links.

But Jeff says this question is not about how we got there; it’s about what we do next.  What we’re doing now doesn’t seem to be working and the President hasn’t presented a convincing plan for moving forward.  By “not working”, BTW, I DON’T mean that our presence in Iraq is responsible for Muslim extremism nor that the French (and many others) have made Iraq the latest in a long line of excuses for anti-Americanism.  “Not working” simply means that brave Americans and Iraqi civilians are being killed and wounded without convincing progress towards a more stable situation despite the fact that an election was held with impressive turnout.

Since putting Iraq together as a democratic and stable country may simply be impossible, we need a plan B.

Plan B is pretty simple: stop trying to put Iraq together.  It has no history of existing as a single country other than in the ruthless bonds of a tyranny or, before that, as an convenience for British imperial  administration.  What was India became India and Pakistan; what was Pakistan became Pakistan and Bangladesh.  The end of Soviet imperial rule was quickly followed by Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia splintering and the splinters are finally beginning to prosper and escape their legacies of hatred. Who says there has to be a country called Iraq?

The most likely partition of Iraq is a “Kurdistan” in the north; a Sunni country in the west; and a Shiite nation in the east. There’s plenty not to like about plan B. 

The Turks don’t want their own Kurds just over the border getting any ideas about independence. But that’s not really our problem.  This part of Iraq has actually functioned pretty well and democratically as a nation in all but name since Gulf War I. We protected it from Saddam.  It is doing well now and doesn’t suffer from the sectarian violence and attacks which have plagued the rest of Iraq. The Kurds would be overjoyed.  We CAN provide them with protection (which they may not need much of) at an acceptable cost because American troops are welcome and not targeted in Kurdish territory.

The Sunni region might get too close to Syria.  Not sure that matters much or that it would actually even happen. The Sunnis are pretty independent and, in general, more secular than the Shiites.

The Shiite region almost certainly would be uncomfortably close in more than geography to Iran. But so what?  It won’t make Iran any more nuclear than it already is. Muqtada al-Sadr is likely to be as much a thorn in the side of the Iranian clergy as he is to almost everybody but his supporters in Iraq. It is the Shiites who would have most to lose by partition since they would be the majority in a unified Iraq – if such a thing is ever to be.

Implementing a partition solution is hardly pleasant. Borders, especially near oil fields, wouldn’t be easy to establish.  Sunnis will be isolated in predominately Shiite place and vice versa. Given the level of hatred, people will be probably be forced from their homes. But this is happening now!

From an American point of view, if it is impossible to establish a stable unified Iraq, this can’t remain our goal. If Iraq is more stable in three pieces and we can go home, good. New Kurdistan would be the only winner in the short-term. The other two areas have to work out their own futures. Good luck to them.  Neither is likely to be a threat to us although they remain threats to each other.

Now suppose this already is our plan B.  If so, the President has a quandary because he can’t announce it. If he does, the Kurds and Sunnis lose all incentive to work with the Shiites on a unified Iraq. If I were President (this is the way Jeff Jarvis asked the question), I would whisper plan B in the ear of the Shiites in the current Iraqi ruling coalition. Tell them they have x months to make the concessions necessary for a stable unified Iraq.  If that doesn’t work, whether it’s their fault or not, plan B.

This could be a reason why the President has been unable to articulate a clear strategy.  Can’t go public on plan B without torpedoing plan A. Probably not but could be.

The Kadima Party, which just finished in front of the pack in the Israeli election, is really a party built on Israel’s plan B.  If negotiations don’t work, withdraw into defensible borders and build a wall around them.  Not a first choice but it is one that allows the Israelis to set the pace rather than their adversaries.  A partitioned Iraq alternative with a deadline does the same thing for us.  A good plan B – a credible plan B – gives plan A a better chance of working because it lets enemies know they can’t preserve an untenable status quo indefinitely.

Any plan for leaving Iraq has to be vetted against its effect on Iran and North Korea.  When it looked like we had a quick success in Iraq, they started to soften and Libya folded.  When it began to look like we are stuck in Iraq, losing public support at home, and deserted by most of the rest of the world, both of these countries hardened their positions.  If we succeed in plan A and leave a democratic and unified Iraq – wow, that would be great.  Why we keep trying.  The present leaders of Iran and North Korea don’t want this democracy thing happening to them. That’s one reason we try so hard.

But, even if we leave a partitioned Iraq behind, we send a pretty powerful message. Part one is if you threaten us enough there will be regime change – we’re good at that – see Iraq and Afghanistan (and don’t forget Germany and Japan). Part two is that we’re better at taking regimes apart than putting new ones together although we did succeed at that after WW II. But, the message goes, we will still flush out a regime which threatens us (that’s different from “displeases” us) and that part of our mission  usually only takes a week or so. We’re actually freer to shove a dangerous Humpty Dumpty off a wall if we don’t feel that we have to put him together again.

Comments

[Matt Blumberg]

We just got back from a long vacation in India. Partition there which split of Pakitstan/Bangladesh is universally viewed as the move that destroyed the country, pitted neighbor against neighbor, left families destitute and fleeing for their lives amidst riots, and created the horror that is Kashmir.

Not saying that forcing Iraq to stay together makes sense, either -- India had a much longer tradition of being a single multi-religious, multi-ethnic society than Iraq, but not sure it's quite that easy to rip a country apart.

[Englishman]

Tom,

Thanks for your post - very interesting and informative.

Absolutely right that there should be a plan 'B', given where we are. Let's hope its much better than Plan 'A', because it was pretty obvious to anyone that cared to look from the beginning that Plan 'A' was either dishonest, delusional, or possibly both.

The strategic imperative for the USA was to occupy and build bases in Iraq, and install a plient client regime, to control the oil reserves and markets. All the talk about democracy and WMD was to manufacture a consensus for this realpolitik action.

Trouble is that the client has so far proved impossible to install, and the level of sustained resistance to foreign occupation has proved far higher than expected. The plan at the moment seems to be to press on long enough for the resistance to die down, and a suitable client regime to be installed.

In the mean time, more of America's [and Britain's] poor whites and blacks come home in body bags, the US's reputation hangs in shreds, and its economy is being ransacked by its military-industrial complex under the supervision of the Bush administration.

China, in the mean time, waits on the sidelines with huge holdings of US dollars, and able to destabilise the US economy any time it feels that it is in its national interest.

The key question is will the American-led coalition break the Iraqi will to resist foreign occupation before the Iraqi insurgency breaks the US will to fight through the massive casualty toll, and possibly its economic ability to do so.

I suspect that Plan 'C' will turn out to be that the coalition will have to withdraw on whatever terms it can, whilst loudly proclaiming victory as a fig leaf for strategic failure.

As the Irishman famously said when asking for directions, "To be sure, I wouldn't be starting from here".

[jonathan]

I think you forgot one thing: oil. Isn't the oil all concentrated in (what would become) the Sunni region? What will stop the Kurds and Shiites from counting until "10" and then going after the oil? And Turkey, a 1.) Moslem country with 2) a large standing army 3.) strong aspirations to be part of the EU, 4.) its own history of abusing their Kurdish minority 5.) a member of NATO (i.e. a strong ally..usually) and 6.) an extraordinarily strategic location, is paranoid about their own Kurdish population. How badly does the US want to de-stabilize them? Answer: Not.

I never supported the war, although Colin Powell at the UN was pretty convincing. In retrospect, I feel like that was all stuff taken out of context and reassembled to create a case for war. Maybe he wanted to believe it to please his boss, maybe he just wanted to get some shooting practice (I think it was the former, BTY). Saddam was a pretty bad guy, but there are worse we do nothing about. And, if you read David Fromkin's highly regarded "A Peace to End All Peace" (Madeline Albright once said it was among the best books on the Middle East), you can figure out why Saddam was not embraced by nor embracing Arab terrorism (they hated each other forever) until the US gave them a need to. Those who ignore history....

The US got itself into the mess. It has to get itself out of it. Maybe partition could work, but lets make sure we all realize this in't like getting boxers to simply go back to their corners.

[Sean]

Would whispering in the ears of the Shia really force them to push harder for a unity government? Might they prefer to have their own country with the southern oil reserves? Also, I'm not sure how you prevent the Sunni country from turning into a failed state that we end up having to invade all over again either because it threatens Kurdistan and/or harbors international terror organizations.
While I agree that having a Plan B is needed, and I love the idea of supporting the Kurds, I'm not convinced that this is it.

[tommy khan]

Please see my comments here:

http://kamakshya.blogspot.com/2005/05/chronicle-of-catastrophe-foretold.html