Dear President Obama:
We just visited Yorktown, site of the decisive battle of the American Revolution. I'm sure you know the history of that battle well. Respectfully, I'd like to point out some lessons for the great decisions you are faced with.
British General Cornwallis, who was a decisive man, occupied the port town on the York River as a future base for the British navy in the colonies. One of the reasons for his choice was that the mouth of the river could easily be defended by a relatively small line of ships. However, the southern British fleet dithered about whether to leave the Caribbean and the northern fleet carried out endless preparation in New York City. So the first navy to arrive at the mouth of the York River was French under Admiral de Grasse. He promptly set up a blockade and the trap began to close on Cornwallis.
Finally the combined British fleet did arrive. The French were caught unaware and had to cut their anchor chains to come out for battle; their ships were in disarray. But British Admiral Graves was a cautious man. He drew his ships up in the traditional line and waited for the French to attack; this allowed the French to regroup. The battle was technically a draw; both navies were severely damaged. But a tie goes to the defense. The French ships resumed their positions at the mouth of the river and Graves felt the British fleet was too weak to run the gauntlet. Back to New York they sailed. The noose tightened around Cornwallis.
General George Washington had not waited to see if the French fleet would arrive in time or whether it would be successful in defending against the stronger British navy. His army of American and French troops was on the march South from NYC to Yorktown. By the time that British General Clinton - not a decisive man - found out that Washington was not going to attack NYC, it was too late to march his army down to help Cornwallis. When the normally restrained Washington heard the results of the naval battle, he jumped for joy.
By this time Cornwallis knew that a large army was coming to besiege him. He probably could have escaped with his army back to South Carolina or up to New York. But he had a message from Clinton telling him to hold tight; any day now a bigger British fleet would sail down, break the blockade, and land 5000 fresh troops. Cornwallis dug in; the French and Americans tightened the siege circle around them and bombarded the British positions day and night. Two brave assaults on British redoubts, one led by Alexander Hamilton with bayonets and unloaded muskets, were successful and the allied cannons and siege guns were now impossibly close to the innermost British line.
Clinton and Graves were making endless preparations to leave New York.
Cornwallis tried desperately for time and asked for 24 hours to negotiate surrender. "I'll give you two," said Washington. It was over. Clinton and Graves were finally en route to Yorktown when they got word of the defeat and went back. The British force in Yorktown was captured; the British public turned against the war. There wasn't a treaty for two years, but Yorktown was the last real battle.
NOT deciding whether or not to impose a no fly zone on the Libyan air force is worse than deciding not to. The rebels deserve to know whether they're going to get help so they can plan accordingly. IMHO we ought to help in this way, even though we can't be the world's policeman and Defense Secretary Gates is right to warn that a no fly zone has to start, as it did in Iraq, by eliminating Libyan antiaircraft. But delaying a decision, whether because of UN or NATO dithering or disagreement within our own government is the worst decision we can make. Libyans are dying because we haven't helped them; Libyans are dying because they don't know whether we'll help them. We mustn't leave them trapped by our indecision the way Clinton left Cornwallis.
Respectfully,
Tom Evslin